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YUGOSLAVIA: YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW
by
LIEUTENANT COLONEL REDMOND V . FORRESTER, USA

(Editor's Note: This article is based on a
Research Report prepared by Colonel
Forrester when he was a student at the US
Army War College in 19 71.)

shattered by a COMINFORM communique
expelling Yugoslavia from the Communist
family. Tito was accused of many actions
deviating from Communist doctrines, but
actually the heart of the dispute "concerned
who was to control Yugoslavia, Stalin or
Tito."l
The break between the two countries was
never healed. Tito turned for assistance to
other sources, including the United States,
and since that time has continued to pursue
his own brand of communism. Yugoslavia has
remained nonaligned in that she has never
returned to the Soviet camp, nor has she
openly sided with the West. Tito still
continues to dominate the political scene,
pursuing policies which he believes are in the
best interests of Yugoslavia. His personality
and strong will were responsible for the break
with Moscow in 1948 and for holding the
country on the path of nonalignment despite
competition by East and West for his
allegiance. His central role in the direction of
modern Yugoslavia poses the major problem.
Tito is 79 and is not immortal. What happens
to Yugoslavia after Tito?

In a period of just over one year, President
Nixon and President Tito of Yugoslavia have
exchanged state visits. What events prompted
this exchange? What is in store for Yugoslavia
after the death of President Tito, and what
policies can the United States adopt with
respect to Yugoslavia to insure a continuation
of cordial and cooperative relations between
the two nations?
BACKGROUND

Yugoslavia, while a Communist state,
maintains a policy of nonalignment. The
success of Yugoslavia's maintenance of this
neutralist position in the competing world of
East and West has been attributed largely to
the personality and authority of Marshal Josip
Broz Tito.
For three years following the establishment
of the Republic of Yugoslavia under Tito's
leadership it was a perfect model of the Soviet
Union. Then, in June 1948, this model was

YUGOSLAVIA TODAY

Yugoslavia in 1972 is far different from the
nation that emerged after World War II. Many
changes have been wrought, both politically
and economically. Tito is still in command,
but many of his policies more closely
resemble those of a Western country than of a
Communist nation. In order to see Tito's
republic fully, one must examine closely the
institutions, personalities, policies, and
problems that make up this enigma of the
modern world. A look at Yugoslavia today
will provide a basis for a projection of
Yugoslavia tomorrow.
The
government
of
Government.
Yugoslavia is set forth in the country's third

Lieutenant Colonel Forrester, Field Artillery,
USAWC 1971, earned his BS degree from the United
States Military Academy and an MPIA (International
Relations) from the University of Pittsburgh. He has
held command and staff positions in air defense and
field artillery units. Prior to a
tour in Vietnam with the 4th
iInfantry Division, he served on
the Army General Staff with
ODCSOPS. He has served
tours in Alaska and Korea.
Lieutenant Colonel Forrester
is currently on the faculty of
the
Resident
School,
Industrial College of
the
Armed Forces.

k

50

President Tito with President Nixon during President Tito's visit to the United States.

constitution, which was adopted in 1963.
This new constitution, designed to show the
p r o g r e s s i n d e c e n t r a l i z i n g authority,
maintained the six republics and two
autonomous regions. T o structure the
government, it created the following agencies
or offices: President, Vice President, Federal
Assembly, Federal Executive Council, and a
Constitutional Court. The President, elected
by the federal deputies, may serve only two
consecutive four-year terms. This does not
apply to Tito who holds the office for life.2 It
has been indicated that the political system
set forth in the 1963 constitution was
extremely complicated, but the intent was t o
allow more participation by the people in all
levels of government. The basic electoral
system begins with the local communes,
whose councils, consisting of two parts, are
elected by all persons over age 21 and by all
workers in state organizations. These councils
merge with other communal councils to form
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a constituency and elect representatives t o the
regional assemblies of the six republics and
deputies t o sit in the Federal Assembly.3 The
system thus results in a semblance of
parliamentary democracy.
The Party. The Yugoslav Communist Party
was formed in April 1919. Tito, who
witnessed the Russian revolution as a prisoner
of war, returned to his native Croatia as an
avid Bolshevik and joined the local party in
1920. He subsequently became t h e General
Secretary of the Party. 4
Y u g o s l a v i a ' s wayward brand of
communism had an independent character
from the very beginning. Many of its members
were young intellectuals who joined the party
"out of protest and disillusionment a t the
conditions around them." They knew little of
Marx's writings and did not belong to the
working class. As a consequence, "they made
Yugoslav communism far more independent
in character than the communism of other

observers, both domestic and foreign, feel
that it would be up to the Army to act as
chief guardian of the 'Yugoslav concept,'
should bickering develop between the
Communist leaders of the six republics after
Tito leaves the scene."8
The Army's
popularity among the people may enable it t o
overcome regional differences if it ever has to
preserve the "Yugoslav Concept."
The Economy. The status of Yugoslavia's
economy may well influence the direction
that a future government will take after Tito.
Most of the political in-fighting was centered
about the liberal trends evolving in the
country and especially the competitive-style
economy.
Looking briefly at the economy, one finds
much change since the formation of the
Republic. Starting out under a strict Soviet
type of controlled economy, Yugoslavia was
forced to abandon her early programs which
were dependent on Soviet aid and capital. The
United States and other Western countries
provided assistance t o help the Yugoslavs
remain independent of Soviet control. In the
early 1950's, purely Communist policies such
as collectivization of agriculture were
abandoned and experiments in workers' self
management were undertaken. The country
did not turn completely capitalist, as social
ownership of capital goods was retained and
the prime land remained in the hands of
agricultural enterprises. The 1950's and
1960's saw continued economic growth and
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , coupled with more
economic decentralization. Along with this
change came balance of payments problems.
In 1965, a program was started which
changed the economy into a "market-type,
Western-style" one. Emphasis was placed on
consumption as opposed to investment.
R e s o u r c e s w e r e concentrated on
c o m p e t i t i v e - t y p e enterprises. Greater
authority for investment was given to local
banks, government levies were reduced, and
direct dealings between Yugoslav and foreign
enterprises was authorized. Tito's support for
the reform quelled opposition within the
higher ranks of the Party.9
We have in Yugoslavia today a unique form
of socialism differing radically from Moscow's

countries." T h e Party membership
transcended regional boundaries or religions
and gave the movement an "all-Yugoslav
structure." The Communist organization in
Yugoslavia today still maintains this
all-encompassing character and represents the
country as a whole, and not the individual
regions or republics.5
In 1952, the Party was renamed the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia. The new name
did not change its influence in Yugoslav life,
and most observers today agree that despite
its internal divisions and difficulties, the Party
remains in effective control of the
government and country. Any relaxation of
policies is done with the full cognizance of
the Party. The League carries basically the
same organization as most Communist parties.
In an attempt to reduce the concentration of
power, Tito proposed a collective rule for the
party in 1969. The 154-member Central
C o m m i t t e e would be replaced by a
300-member Party Conference which would
meet annually. The existing Presidium, which
was the policy making organ of the Party, was
to be expanded to a membership of 52. The
actual leadership of the Party would be vested
in a 15-man Executive Bureau composed of
equal representation from each republic and
autonomous region. Tito would chair the
group. The purpose of the reorganization was
to insure Party unity.6
The Military. The Army is considered to be
Yugoslavia's "most important unifying
institution, next to Tito himself." The Army
was criticized after the Czech crisis for its
slow mobilization and its poor deployment.
Emphasis was placed on bringing the military
"back into the mainstream of political life."
Officers who appeared to be pro-Soviet were
removed and the role of the military was
reassessed. Evidence of the modernization
that is underway appeared as a 14 percent
increase in the 1970 budget for defense
expenditures.7 Additionally, Yugoslavia has
formed partisan units from other elements of
the population and appears to be prepared to
defend the country, should the Brezhnev
D o c t r i n e be a p p l i e d as it was in
Czechoslovakia. Beyond defense against
outside aggression lies the fact that "most
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Yugoslavia was to survive outside the Soviet
camp. The primary domestic policy cutting
across the economic and political scene has
b e e n t h a t of decentralization. The
government began this decentralization in the
early 1950's, and it continues today.
One of the initial reforms was the
establishment of Workers' Councils to manage
the factories. These still exist and function as
a "board of directors" for the enterprise.
They are elected by the other employees and
"they set production quotas, decide on
marketing techniques, hire and fire managers,
and even raise-or on occasion, slash-their
own salaries."lO Every enterprise of more

state socialism. It replaces state ownership
and control of production with workers' self
management of each industry, competing
among enterprises, and major reliance upon
market forces in the domestic economy and
foreign trade. Finding solutions to the
problems of inflation, unemployment, and
balance o f p a y m e n t s deficits which
accompanied the new economic orientation in
Yugoslavia may well influence whether or not
she returns to a strict Communist system after
Tito.
Policies. The break with Moscow forced a
c h a n g e i n p o l i c y o n the Yugoslav
Government. Reforms were necessary if
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than five employees is run by a Workers'
Council and competes in the open market. In
1965, Tito stopped government subsidies of
businesses and they now make money or they
fold. 11
Decentralization in the economic system
was accompanied by similar change in the
political system. More latitude was given the
"people's committees" which had previously
been "local instruments of the federal
government in Belgrade." While the Party's
r o l e r e m a i n e d s t r o n g , there was a
strengthening of the local organizations which
eventually became the communes under the
1963 constitution. 12
Whether or not a
Communist state ever decentralizes authority
is a matter for debate. However, in the case of
Yugoslavia's communes, a Western observer
has stated:
They are recognized organs of
government, not mere "front"
organizations. They have their own
sources of income. They exercise real
power over enterprises and public
services. Inspired by local pride and
pressures, they have often used those
powers unwisely, but the important
political fact is that they have used them
at all.13
The relaxed policies of the government are
often punctuated by periods of toughness,
but the tendency has been t o grant more
freedom and yield t o the desires of the
people. This is evident in Tito's conceding t o
student demands during the 1968 riots by
p r o m i s i n g " immediate and long-term
reforms," and his quelling demonstrations by
the Albanian minority "with promises of
greater autonomy and more rapid economic
betterment. . . ." 14
Yugoslavia's foreign policy has had three
dimensions since the break with Russia. Tito
has looked toward the East, the West, and the
nonaligned world. With respect t o her eastern
policy, relations with the Bloc countries
appear t o be relatively normal. She trades
with the Eastern European countries, and
their occasional denunciations of Yugoslav
policies d o not seem to alter relations to any

degree. Relations with the Soviet Union are a
different matter. These fluctuate, ranging
from friendly after Khrushchev's visit in 1955
to hostile after the Czech invasion. A. W.
Palmer has aptly described this ambivalent
relationship:
Relations between the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia since 1955 have shown all the
breath-taking variations in temperament
of a teenage romance. There have been
reconciliations and gifts and rows and
flirting with that Common Market boy
next door and more reconciliations, more
gifts, more angry words, and further
covert glances across the garden fence;
and so on.15
Brezhnev's recent visit was friendly and one
might say that the flirting has started again.
US-Yugoslav relations began in earnest with
economic assistance in 1948 t o preclude
Yugoslavia from slipping back under Soviet
d o m i n a t i o n . Relations have remained
relatively good between the two countries
despite Tito's pronouncements against US
policy in Vietnam, Cuba, and the Dominican
Republic. While US economic assistance was
stopped by Congress in 1967, trade has
continued and Yugoslavia has been given
most-favored-nations status by the United
States. Additionally, Yugoslavia is the only
Communist state with which the United
S t a t e s h a s a n educational exchange
agreement.16
The third direction of Yugoslav foreign
policy concerns the nonaligned nations.
Yugoslavia has attempted t o establish
relations with states which are not tied either
to the Soviet Union or the United States. Tito
has traveled extensively throughout the
nonaligned nations and Yugoslavia has
conducted trade with these nations. While she
would like to tie her economy more strongly
to this Third World where there are no US or
USSR strings, she is forced t o trade with the
West and East, because the more developed
nations can provide the capital goods which
she needs and can absorb the products which
she has t o export. Despite the economic
magnet drawing Yugoslavia to the developed
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nations, she has maintained political contacts
with the nonaligned states.17
Problems. While Yugoslavia appears to be
well on its way to being the freest, most open
and democratic of Communist states, this
certainly does not mean the country will lack
for problems. Tito has managed to keep these
problems under control and move the country
ahead, but a lesser individual might not be
able to withstand the pressures of the Soviet
Union, conflict among the republics, and the
myriad of economic problems facing the small
nation.
One of the most persistent problems in
Yugoslavia is that of holding six republics and
two autonomous regions together as a viable
state. The different groupings of nationalities
have posed problems since the beginning of
time. Ever since the founding of the Republic,
Tito has had to balance his policies cautiously
to satisfy the diverse elements of the six
republics.
Historically, the Slovenes and Croats have
opposed domination by Serbia. Relations
between these Yugoslav Republics have not
eased over the years. Additionally, resentment
has grown in the northern republics over the
requirement for them to help finance the
development of the more backward areas of
the country. Tito alone has been the force
which kept "these internal tensions from
fragmenting the nation."18
Other problems facing Yugoslavia are
economic in nature. Growing inflation forced
the government to impose a six-month price
freeze, the legislature is grappling with the
problem of budgetary deficits, and a solution
to increasing balance of payments deficits
must be found. The students are complaining
"that Yugoslavia is reverting to a class system,
with Communist Party officials at the top and
workers at the bottom."19
In the area of foreign relations, Yugoslavia
faces additional dilemmas. Fear exists that the
Brezhnev Doctrine could at any moment be
applied to Yugoslavia, and for this reason Tito
must look to the United States more than he
would like. At the same time, suspicion about
the motives of the United States and the
Soviet Union is generated by the SALT talks,
as Tito recalls World War II proposals which,

whatever their intention, have come to stand
for superpowers disposing of the interests of
smaller countries. Additionally, the problem
of buying modern aircraft, anti-tank and
anti- aircraft guns, and other military
equipment for the defense of the country
without becoming heavily dependent on any
single source of supply and without
overstraining Yugoslavia's limited resources, is
still another in the long list of worries facing
the aging marshal.20
TRENDS

It would seem that two decades of
experimenting and changing systems would
present a fairly stable system for projecting
the future of Yugoslavia. However, such is not
the case, and Yugoslavia's future appears t o
remain, if anything, more elusive than ever.
Nevertheless, several noticeable trends can be
seen in Yugoslav political and economic life
which perhaps point to the future after Tito.
These are the continued decentralization of
political and economic authority; retention of
federal primacy in national defense, foreign
affairs, and the unified national market;
formal nonalignment as the basis for a
balanced increase in exchanges both with
Western countries and Eastern Europe and
developing countries; and a persistent
problem with reconciling the Yugoslav
national interest with the competing claims of
nationalism in the constituent republics. All
of these trends are apparent from reports
coming out of Yugoslavia.
The 1963 constitution delegated broad
powers to the individual republics. Indications
that even further decentralization of power is
being considered, or is at least desired, was
evidenced in a move introduced at a recent
Party conference in which each of the six
republics would be given "complete equality
and near total autonomy."21 Also, a push
toward increased decentralization came in the
form of Tito's recent announcement that he
would be succeeded by a collective body. This
parallels the Party collective leadership in the
form of the Executive Bureau which Tito
established in 1969. The new proposal
visualizes bringing in two or three of the
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incorporated into the "market-type" system,
as were the other enterprises. Censorship is in
the hands of the newspapermen themselves,
and the fact that they are part of the
self-management socialist system of
Yugoslavia seems to be enough control. New
magazines are springing up all over the
country, ranging from news magazines
patterned after those of the United States to
Yugoslav facsimiles of Playboy. In most cases,
circulation of the new publications is
outstripping older papers such as "Borba-the
proud standard bearer of old Yugoslav
C o m m u n i s t s and former wartime
partisans. . . ."26
The goal of Yugoslav foreign policy was
and still is the pursuit of nonalignment.
However, Tito has been forced by the need
for economic and security assistance to look
to the Communist as well as the Free World
states. Though hard to discern, manifestations
of a "leaning" toward the United States and
the West have been gradually appearing in
recent years. Current trade patterns reinforce
the trend toward increasing dependency on
the Western nations, since the trade ratio is
approximately 60 percent with Western
countries, 30 percent with the East, and 10
percent with the nonaligned nations.27
Another recent overt indicator of a possible
changing US-Yugoslav relationship was the
reception accorded Mr. Nixon on his visit to
Tito's Republic. While standing fast on his
policy of nonalignment for Yugoslavia, Tito
turned out the entire nation to greet the US
President and made several personal friendly
overtures during the visit. The Yugoslavs
definitely hoped that the visit would promote
t r a d e and bring in much needed US
investment.28 Tito and Nixon repledged their
friendship and that of the two countries
during Tito's visit to the United States in
1971.
The trend of increasing nationalism by the
republics is really one of overt expression,
since nationalism in the republics is not new.
The decentralization of authority in both
political and economic matters has revived
age-old animosities. Accusations of
chauvinism are rampant. Croatia and Slovenia
have recently asserted more regional identity,

"most influential leaders of each republic to
participate in the federal decision-making
process." It was further proposed that the
collective body be headed by a different
chairman each year, thus "giving each of the
six Yugoslav republics a turn at having its man
in the top job."22 Such a move has two
effects. It guarantees continued decentralized
or local government by hedging against an
a u t h o r i t a r i a n successor w h o would
recentralize control, and it damps republic
nationalism which could result in a
fragmented Yugoslavia after Tito.
R e c e n t economic problems such as
inflation have required the imposition of
some government controls, but there appears
to be no evidence that decentralization in the
economic area will not continue. When Mitja
Ribicic was elected President of the Federal
Executive Council in 1969, he outlined, in a
speech to the Federal Assembly, plans for
drafting a new economic plan which would
"employ self-management techniques 'to the
greatest degree possible.'"23
The Presidium
of the League of Communists also adopted a
resolution in late 1969 which "called for
adherence to the market economy and
increased worker participation in running the
enterprises." 24
Periodicals are full of
examples of increased consumer spending,
individual actions by enterprises to increase
income, and workers' demands similar to
those one would expect in a capitalist
country.
Evidence of increased freedom for the
citizens of Yugoslavia also abounds in news
reports coming out of the country. Typical
reports showing the unregulated life of the
average citizen are those such as the story of
the Belgrade driver who received a number of
parking tickets and was let off with a fine. He
also received no penalty for changing
apartments and failing to report his new
address. Farmers may now reacquire up to 25
acres of private land, people are permitted to
own more than one house, and workers can
strike without fear of recrimination or
"switch jobs with ease and frequency."25
The freedom granted the press in recent
m o n t h s e x t e n d s t h e t r e n d toward
liberalization. The press has now been
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besides Moscow's. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia
continues to strengthen her armed forces and
organize her population for resistance. As she
seeks solutions to her many economic,
political, and security problems, she sees the
West, and particularly the United States, as a
counter t o the Soviet Union.
While decentralization has brought an
increase of chauvinism or nationalism in the
r e p u b l i c s , economic prosperity fosters
cooperation. Most observers believe that the
republics recognize the strength they have as a
unified body. Fragmentation of Yugoslavia
threatens each individual republic. For
e x a m p l e , without unification and the
protection of the central government under
Tito, Macedonia might long ago have fallen to
Bulgaria. While all are vocal in their arguments
with each other, the following description of
Croatia by Dan Morgan would appear to
apply to each of the six republics.

and with the large amount of local control
provided by decentralization are cooperating
with Austria and Italy in many fields, to
include the hiring of Austrian workers and the
establishment of factories across the border in
Austria.29 There are arguments over the
richer republics being required to help finance
the development of the poorer ones, and
there is talk of establishing a Croatian division
in the Army. The strange phenomenon is that
the move for more independence and identity
is not the work of "radical separatists" but of
the local Communist party. 30 The same is
true of Serbia, which is competing for more
Western investment. These economic rivalries,
coupled with former antagonisms between
Catholic Croatia and Orthodox Serbia, when
added to the widening gap between the richer
and poorer republics, seriously hampered the
adoption of a national five-year plan.31
WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

There is no sign that the four million
Croats, who make up a fifth of the
country's population and live in one of
the country's most wealthy and
developed republics, could or would
break away. If nothing else, the presence
of Soviet tanks prowling on the nearby
Hungarian border is a guarantee against
that.32

Basically, the trends appear to be taking
Yugoslavia further and further from a return
to orthodox communism. Decentralization
appears t o be the driving factor in
d e t e r m i n i n g Yugoslavia's future. This,
combined with the trend toward liberalization
or increased personal freedom, argues against
the Yugoslavs returning voluntarily to a strict
Communist system. The local parties are the
staunchest advocates for more autonomy and
there has been an erosion of national party
power.
A more Westward-leaning policy is most
likely the result of Yugoslavia viewing her
interests pragmatically. With continued
demands for more consumer goods, higher
wages, and more voice in the government, it is
highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would
take economic steps to perpetuate such a
system. To allay Russian fears of excessive
revisionism and preclude application of the
Brezhnev Doctrine, the Yugoslavs continue to
emphasize that their system is and will remain
a socialist one compatible with basic Marxism.
If Brezhnev's pronouncements during his
recent visit to Belgrade hold any truth, then
perhaps the Yugoslavs have been successful in
convincing him that there are other roads

TOMORROW

The foregoing examination of modern
Yugoslavia's evolution and the trends which
m a y i n f l u e n c e her future course in
international politics provides the basis for
certain speculations. For instance, who are
the likely successors to Tito? Such names as
Rankovic, Kardelj, and Djilas come to mind
immediately. Observers of the Yugoslav scene
tend to discount them, however. Rankovic
was ousted as Vice President for advocating a
return to more conservative policies; and it
seems unlikely that the Yugoslav people,
having tasted relative freedom, would provide
support to one who would return them to the
days of strong centralized control. Edvard
Kardelj, a former Partisan and long-time
associate of Tito's, could possibly be in line;
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but as one author indicates, "he has never
won great popularity," still appears to the
public as "a schoolmaster and philosopher
rather than a dynamic leader, and as a Slovene
he is a member of a small nationality."33
Milovan Djilas, the controversial writer and
once close associate of Marshal Tito, would
come closest to being a charismatic leader.
While no Yugoslav citizen wants to concede
that Djilas has a chance and Djilas claims no
interest in the job, he nevertheless stands as a
possibility should one-man rule continue after
Tito's death.34 No one seems willing to
hazard a guess; discussions with recent visitors
to Yugoslavia indicate a feeling that all of
these contenders are too old and that if there
is in fact a successor, he will be a younger
man rather than one of the old partisans.
Further speculation centers around the
fragmenting of Yugoslavia after Tito's death.
Again, regular observers tend to discount this
possibility on the basis that economic
cooperation will keep the republics together.
Should this not be the case and the republics
try to go it alone, what could be expected
from the Soviet Union and the United States?
The scenario could take several patterns. The
Soviet Union could recognize them as
individual states and do nothing (a course
which seems highly unlikely), she could wait
to be invited in by one of the republics to
reestablish a unified Yugoslavia, or she could
pick them off one by one through application
of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Her actions would
m o s t likely b e conditioned by the
international environment existing at the
time. It would seem reasonable to guess that
with the current mood of the American
people concerning the Vietnam War and US
foreign involvement in general, the United
States would do little more than offer
material and economic aid on a bilateral basis.
What, then, can be said about Yugoslavia's
future? While no conclusions can be drawn
with finality, the evidence, admittedly
tenuous, points to the following projections.
Some type of collective presidency such as
that proposed by Marshal Tito will be the
most likely form of government, since there
appears to be no strong, charismatic leader
who could gain the support and backing of all

of Yugoslavia's diverse nationalities. The
degree of orderliness in t h e succession of
power will depend to a great degree on how
much Tito has been able to organize such a
group and transfer his authority prior to his
death.
T h e market-type economy will be
continued, with only those central controls
necessary to insure control of inflation and
continued economic growth.
The republics are not likely to split and go
their separate ways, as they recognize that
their political and economic strength lies in
unity. One nationality may emerge as the
leader, however, and play a large part in
setting policy for the group.
Yugoslavia will continue her own path of
nonalignment, but it will probably be a
"pro-Western" nonalignment for economic
and security reasons.
UNITED STATES ACTIONS

The United States has benefited in the past
from Tito's policy of nonalignment, and a
similar policy on the part of the post-Tito
government is of continuing interest to US
policy makers. William Buckley covered only
one of the reasons when he said:

. . . True

that America's policy of
encouraging Titoism in Yugoslavia has
served us. Served us, as beneficiaries of an
East Europe showcase of the relative
advantages of relative freedom-a fox in
the bosom of Soviet ideology.35

There are other reasons why the continued
nonalignment of Yugoslavia is beneficial to
the United States. The rapport which
Yugoslavia has developed with the nations of
the Third World through her aid and
development programs places her in a position
to greatly assist the United States in dealing
with these countries. Additionally, one has
only to look at the map to recognize the
strategic importance of Yugoslavia. Her
seaports along the Adriatic coast highlight the
importance of a neutral Yugoslavia to the
southern flank of NATO. Current outcries for
reduction of US forces abroad make a
58
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